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ON QUINE ON ARROW
MAURICE SALLES
Abstract. This paper describes an unknown episode in the development of the the-
ory of social choice. In the Summer 1949, while at RAND, Quine worked on Arrow’s
(im)possibility theorem. This work was eventually published as a paper on (applied)
set theory totally disconnected from social choice. The working paper directly linked
to Arrow’s work was never published.
JEL classification: C7, D7
1. introduction
In August 1985, while I was participating in the world meeting of the Econometric So-
ciety at MIT in Cambridge (Mass.), I had a browse in the MIT bookshop and came across
the just published autobiography of Willard Van Orman Quine (Quine, 1985). As many
social choice theorists, I had (and still have) a side interest for logic and, by extension, for
analytic philosophy in general. Then, I decided to get a copy and read the book. Reaching
page 217, I discovered an astonishing fact: Quine already knew Arrow’s work on social
choice in 1949 and even made some research based on it. It is remarkable that a scientific
link could be established between two of the major thinkers of the contemporary world of
knowledge.1 However, in Quine (1985) one can read:
‘Rand Corporation was an intelligence facility in the service of national defense. It was
agreeably situated in Santa Monica, a coastal suburb of Los Angeles. My summer job
as consultant there was unprecedentedly remunerative, but apart from that it was a mis-
take. Despite my top-secret clearance in the Navy, fresh clearance was required–reasonably
enough, since a staunch anti-Nazi could be a communist. My new clearance did not arrive
in time, so I was put on boondoggles. One of them concerned Kenneth Arrow’s monograph
on social reconciliation of individual preferences. My resulting memoranda included two
theorems about Boolean functions, ultimately published in Selected Logic Papers. The
Date: Revised, March 2017.
I alluded to this (then unwritten) paper in a number of presentations I made on ‘Logic and Social Choice’
in Turku, Bucharest, Boston, Strasbourg and Munich, between October 2013 and January 2015. It was
eventually first presented during a conference at Queen Mary, University of London, 19-20 June 2015,
on ‘Social Welfare, Justice and Distribution: Celebrating John Roemer’s Contributions to Economics,
Political Philosophy and Political Science’, organized by Roberto Veneziani and Juan Moreno-Ternero. I
am grateful to the participants for interesting reactions and comments, in particular Richard Arneson,
Jon Elster, Marc Fleurbaey, Klaus Nehring and Gil Skillman. Jon Elster contacted Dagfinn Føllesdal, a
well-known philosopher and a pre-eminent Quine scholar, who kindly responded to some queries. A more
developed version was presented in Aix-en-Provence during the International Conference on Economic
Philosophy and in Lund during the meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare in June 2016.
Comments of participants to these two events revealed to be very helpful, among which comments by
Gilles Campagnolo, Christian List and John Weymark. While in Lund, I also greatly benefitted from
conversations with Adrian Miroiu. Finally, I am very grateful to an Associate Editor of this journal for
excellent suggestions and for detecting some very annoying slips.
1A non-Anglo-Saxon mainstream economist may have never heard of Quine. Although I will not endorse
this type of ranking, Quine was ranked fifth in a ranking of the most important philosophers of the past
200 years–after Wittgenstein, Frege, Russell and Mill, but before Kripke, Nietzsche and Marx. This
ranking is based on a survey by Brian Leiter, an American philosopher and Professor of Jurisprudence




other project was in game theory. My memorandum on this was subsequently incorpo-
rated by McKinsey and Krentel into an article under our three names.’ 2
It seems that the word ‘Boondoggle’ is rather disparaging. In another (shorter) auto-
biography (Quine, 1986) Quine speaks of ‘innocuous projects’, which seems to me more
appropriate.3 Anyway, boondoggle or not, Quine in 1966 judged that the paper was suffi-
ciently interesting to be published in his Selected Logic Papers.
In 1986 I wrote to Quine and, to my great surprise, received a hand-written response
in French. I asked Quine whether he had ever worked on Arrow’s theorem after his 1949
stay at Rand corporation. He replied: ‘Malheureusement je ne me suis plus occupe´ du
re´sultat de Kenneth Arrow depuis cet e´poque tellement e´loigne´’ (his French was excellent
except that ‘e´poque’ is a feminine word and, accordingly, the correct spelling should have
been ‘depuis cette e´poque tellement e´loigne´e’).4 With his letter, Quine was so kind as to
send me his page-proofs (with his hand-written corrections) of the relevant chapter in his
Selected Logic Papers.5
I subsequently left this question aside until I recently decided to work on a partly his-
torical monograph on logic and social choice.
I will first present in this paper the chapter On Boolean functions as it is in the Selected
Logic Papers. Then I will describe the Rand memoranda related to Arrow’s impossibility
theorem.
2. On Boolean functions
It is very difficult to perceive how Chapter XVI of Selected Logic Papers is related to
Arrow’s impossibility theorem. Neither Arrow nor the aggregation of individual prefer-
ences are mentioned and there are no references. We are left somewhat in the dark with
the vague phrase ‘utility concept’ in the first sentence:
‘As auxiliaries to a concurrent study of the utility concept, two theorems of set theory
are proving useful. The envisaged application of these theorems concerns only relations,
or sets of ordered pairs, whereas the theorems hold for sets generally. Consequently the
two theorems are most conveniently set forth separately from the eventual memorandum
in which they are to be applied.’
The two theorems are, as Quine said, theorems of set theory, but I do not know whether
they have been used or applied somewhere.
2See Quine (1966,1995) for the Selected Logic Papers and Krentel, McKinsey and Quine (1951) for the
game theory paper. McKinsey was a mathematical logician and game theorist located at RAND in 1949
and later at Stanford. He authored one of the first textbooks on game theory (McKinsey, 1952).
3Although the shorter autobiography was published later than The Time of my Life, it was, according
to Quine, written several years before.
4‘Unfortunately I never dealt with Kenneth Arrow’s result since this so remote time.’
5I purchased a copy of the enlarged edition when it appeared in 1995.
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A Boolean function is defined as a set which is specifiable in terms of given sets by
means exclusively of intersection, union and by taking complements.6
Quine then proposes to link general functions taking sets as arguments (variables) and
as values to Boolean functions.
Precisely, let φ be any n-ary function.
Definition 1. The function φ is said to be a parametric Boolean function if there are sets
H1,..., Hr for some r and an (n+ r)-ary Boolean function ψ such that for all sets F1,...,
Fn,
φ(F1, ..., Fn) = ψ(H1, ...,Hr, F1, ..., Fn)
Two sets are said to agree in an object x when x belongs to both or to neither.
Definition 2. An n-ary function φ is said to preserve agreement when the following law
holds:
If F1,..., Fn, G1,..., Gn are any sets and x is an object in which Fi and Gi agree pair-
wise for each i, then φ(F1, ..., Fn) and φ(G1, ..., Gn) agree in x.
Then we can state the first theorem.
Theorem 1. A function is a parametric Boolean if and only if it preserves agreement.
It seems rather obvious that agreement preservation is related to independence of irrel-
evant alternatives and that Theorem 1 provides an equivalence to independence.
The second theorem is even more easily interpretable in the context of social choice.
Definition 3. An n-ary Boolean function φ is thoroughly commutative if for all sets F1,...,
Fn and every permutation G1, ..., Gn of them φ(F1, ..., Fn) = φ(G1, ..., Gn).
The incidence of x in the sets F1,..., Fn is the number of sets from F1,..., Fn to which
x belongs. It will be denoted by Ix(F1, ..., Fn).
The second relates the thorough commutativity to some integer.
Theorem 2. An n-ary function φ, whose arguments and values are sets, is a thoroughly
commutative Boolean function if and only if there is a class N of natural numbers ≤ n
such that for all sets F1,..., Fn, and all objects x,
x is an element of φ(F1, ..., Fn) if and only if Ix(F1, ..., Fn) belongs to N .
3. The Rand memoranda
In 1949 Quine authored three Rand memoranda:
–A theorem on parametric Boolean functions, RM-196, dated 27 July 1949,
–Commutative Boolean functions, RM-199, dated 10 August 1949 and
–On functions of relations, with especial reference to social welfare, RM-218, dated 19
August 1949.
The concatenation of the first two memoranda essentially constitutes the paper published
6Quine writes: ‘Any set which is specifiable in terms of the given sets F1,..., Fn by means exclusively
of intersect, union, and complement is called a Boolean function of F1,...,Fn.’ I agree with the Associate
Editor’s comment that it would be better to write that a Boolean function assigns sets given a well
specified domain. Furthermore, the now standard way to define Boolean functions is the following: a
Boolean function is a function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}. The choice of 0 and 1 is purely symbolic; it could be
{T, F} or {−1, 1} etc. as long as we have two-alternative sets.
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in Selected Logic Papers. So the remaining part of my paper will be devoted to RM-218.
It is rather curious that, according to their dates, the more abstract papers precede the
memorandum which is, in some sense, an application, and, as a consequence, less abstract
or more precisely more interpretable from an intuitive standpoint. But one can suppose
that RM-218 was conceived before the other two. This research memorandum includes
a reference to ‘Kenneth J. Arrow The possibility of a universal welfare function RAD(L)
289. This is probably the same document as The possibility of a universal social welfare
function P-41 dated 26 September 1948. I have been unable to trace RAD(L) 289. In
Amadae (2003, p.85), one can read:
This puzzle led to Arrow’s initial formulation of his impossibility theorem, titled “So-
cial Choice and Individual Values,” RAND report RM-291, 28 July 1949.
I have also been unable to find this document whose title is strangely identical to Arrow’s
monograph (1951, 1963) and whose date and number are not consistent with Quine’s RM-
218. As a consequence I even doubted that Arrow and Quine met at RAND in 1949 until,
in a private communication, Arrow wrote me ‘I did meet him (Quine) briefly at RAND. I
did not meet him when I was at Harvard...’.
3.1. Postulate P1: preservation of agreement. In the first section of RM-218, Quine
introduces the notion of aggregation of individual orderings function, denoted by F (then
we have a social ordering given by F (R1, ..., Rn) where the Ris are the individual order-
ings) mentioning that such a function must satisfy suitable conditions and justifies his
work by stating “The purpose of the present paper is to transform certain such conditions
into logical equivalents with a view to illuminating those conditions and making them
easier to work with.”
Quine formally considers binary relations (which Quine calls ‘relations’), that is subsets
of the Cartesian product of a basic set X by itself or sets of ordered pairs. Then two
binary relations R and S are said to agree in a pair < x, y > when < x, y > is an element
of both R and S or of neither. Although Quine does not mention the phrase Independence
of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) but only mentions Arrow’s Condition 2 (in RAD(L)-289)
his P1 is obviously IIA.
P1. For all relations R1,..., Rn, S1,..., Sn and all objects x and y, if R1 agrees with S1 in
< x, y >, and R2 with S2,..., and Rn with Sn, then F (R1, ..., Rn) agrees with F (S1, ..., Sn)
in < x, y >.7
One can remark that this is basically similar to Definition 2.8
Then Quine defines Boolean functions and parametric Boolean functions essentially as
in his previous RAND memorandum RM-196 and as in Quine (1995).
‘A function of R1,..., Rn is called Boolean if constructed of R1,..., Rn by means exclu-
sively of intersect, union, and complement.’
‘An n-ary function ψ is called a parametric Boolean function if there are relations H1,...,
Hr and an (n + r)-ary Boolean function φ such that, for all choices of R1,..., Rn,
7In the RAND document by Arrow I was able to read, IIA is Condition 3 and is presented in terms
of choice sets. According to Quine the binary–pairwise–version has been shown to be equivalent to the
choice sets version by Norman Dalkey.
8The notations P1, P2... are for Postulate 1, Postulate 2... as can be checked before the statement of
P2.
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ψ(R1, ..., Rn) = φ(H1, ...,Hr, R1, ..., Rn).’
9
Quine then states:
‘Now P1 is equivalent to this:
F is a parametric Boolean function.’
For the proof, Quine refers to his previous memorandum. He also mentions that, as a
by-product of this proof, ‘P1 guarantees the existence of relations K1,..., K2n such that,
for all choices of R1,..., Rn




One needs some explanations regarding the Ri and about the meaning of Σ and of the
contiguity of relations.










= R1 R2... Rn.
Furthermore, Σ is the symbol used for union, contiguity means intersection and an overline
is for complements. Accordingly, with standard notations, we should have:
F (R1, ..., Rn) =
⋃2n
i=1Ki ∩Ri and
R1 is equal to R1 ∩R2 ∩ ... ∩Rn
R2 = R1 ∩R2 ∩ ... ∩Rn
.
.
Rn+1 = R1 ∩R2 ∩ ... ∩Rn





= R1 ∩R2 ∩ ... ∩Rn.
Quine does not offer any comments. Of course, in 1949, the Arrovian condition of
independence of irrelevant alternatives and its consequences had been hardly discussed
and even completely understood. 10
9Strangely, the roles of ψ and φ have been reversed.
10Although in Arrow’s memorandum one can understand the meaning of ‘Condition 3 implies that
in considering C(S), we can disregard all preferences among alternatives not in S’, in the memorandum
as in Arrow (1951) it is shown that Borda’s rule does not satisfy IIA, which, of course, is true, through
an example where the IIA which is considered is related to the Nash version of IIA which states that
if the chosen elements in a set belong to some subset of this set, the chosen elements in the subset are
identical to the chosen elements in the set. Some scholars believe that Nash (1950) borrowed his notion
of IIA from Arrow’s notion, but this is dubious since Nash never used, to the best of my knowledge, the
phrase ‘independence of irrelevant alternatives.’ These two notions are different mathematical objects, one
being linked to choice functions (Nash and many later developments on set-theoretic revealed preference
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3.2. Postulate P2: Symmetry over objects. According to Quine, the construction
from a (binary) relation of a new relation where the objects x and y are interchanged but
‘leaving all other objects unchanged’ is due to Dalkey. Quine denotes by Rxy the relation
obtained from R by interchanging x and y. In fact this is obviously a transposition in
combinatorial theory and we know that a permutation is the product of transpositions.
Quine mentions that ‘an interesting postulate on F that Dalkey has propounded is this:
P2 For all R1,..., Rn, x, y,
[F (R1, ..., Rn)]
xy = F (Rxy1 , ..., R
xy
n ).’
Quine justly observes that ‘The substance of this postulate is that F (R1, ..., Rn) is to
make use of no special features of objects over and above their manner of occurence in
R1,..., Rn.’ This notion is now known as neutrality . However, one must distinguish a
form of neutrality which can be called combinatorial neutrality from the more standard
form of neutrality which one deals with in social choice, neutrality which can be called
preference-based neutrality or, by analogy with welfarism, preferencism.11 To clarify this
distinction consider Borda’s rule with three individuals 1, 2 and 3, four objects x, y, z, w




With Borda’s scores given by (3,2,1,0) (3 for top, 2 for second, 1 for third and 0 for
last), x has a score of 8 y a score of 7.




The objects x and y have been interchanged in the sense of Dalkey/Quine and now the
scores are 8 for y and 7 for x. Postulate P2 has been satisfied.




One can observe that, preference-wise, x and y were again interchanged (compared with
the first set of three relations). But the score of x is 7 and the score of y is 6, so that, in
spite of the interchange, the result (collective preference) regarding x and y is the same,
showing that Borda’s rule does not satisfy preferencism although it satisfies combinatorial
neutrality.
theory) and the other being linked to aggregation of individual data, for instance, preferences. Kuhn
(see Kuhn and Nasar (2002)) in his Editor’s introduction to Nash (1950) explicitly mentions the phrase
independence of irrelevant alternatives. At this time, I am still unable to determine the date when the
phrase ‘independence of irrelevant alternatives’ has been introduced in the context of a non-Arrovian
framework.
11It is this notion of preferencism and its implications which is at the origin of the developments on the
non-welfaristic approaches in social choice following Sen (1970a,b). For a recent discussion of neutrality
by Sen, see Sen (2014).
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The relation of identity is then defined as the set of pairs of the form < x, x > and is
denoted by I. Quine shows that adding P2 to P1 amounts to adding the following to the
former result: F has no parameters but I. I quote from RM-218: ‘In other words, P1-2 are
equivalent to saying that there is an (n+1)-ary Boolean function φ such that, for all R1,...,
Rn,
F (R1, ..., Rn) = φ(I,R1, ..., Rn).’
In Quine’s words, this is ‘a considerable simplification.’ However, since scoring rules,
such as Borda’s rule or plurality rule, do not satisfy IIA, and since combinatorial neutrality
is not imposed in the Arrovian framework, the functions F which can be considered will
be rather limited (pairwise voting rules where the names of objects/candidates do not
matter, for instance majority rule or pairwise voting rules associated with a simple game
structure).12
3.3. Postulate P3: Thorough commutativity. Again Quine refers to Dalkey who pro-
posed a postulate which will be Quine’s third postulate, denoted P3.
P3 For all relations R1,..., Rn, and every permutation S1,..., Sn thereof,
F (R1, ..., Rn) = F (S1, ..., Sn).
In Quine’s words, ‘the order of arguments of F is immaterial; F is, in a word, thor-
oughly commutative.’ Obviously this postulate of thorough commutativity is what social
choice theorists call anonymity. Then Quine adds P3 to his two other postulates. He
considers the complement I of his identity relation, that is the set of pairs < x, y > such
that x 6= y and if a pair is an element of exactly i of the relations R1,..., Rn, i is said to
be the incidence of the pair in R1,..., Rn.
Considering the three postulates together, Quine demonstrates the following result:
‘There are classes A and B of natural numbers ≤ n such that , for all choices of R1,...
Rn, F (R1, ..., Rn) = the set of all identity pairs whose incidence in R1,..., Rn belongs to
A, and all diversity pairs whose incidence in R1,..., Rn belongs to B.’
Of course, assuming anonymity in addition to P1 and P2 still reduces the set of pos-
sible F . For instance, if we consider voting games previously mentioned, we will have to
restrict ourselves to the so-called quota games (voting games where coalitions are winning
according to the number of voters belonging to the coalitions).
In his last section, Quine considers relations of the form ‘better than’ (strict preference)
and relations of the form ‘no worse than’ (weak preference). He obviously assumes that
the relation ‘no worse than’ is complete. He then reformulates his result: if we choose the
‘better than’ interpretation we exclude all identity pairs and if we choose the ‘no worse
than’ interpretation we include them all. In both cases, the so-called class A disappears
from the statement of the result.
4. conclusion
In my view, the most important part of Quine’s work is his alternative definition of IIA.
The proof of the equivalence between P1, i.e. IIA, and the fact that F is a parametric
Boolean function is far from trivial. Since Quine’s declared purpose was to ‘illuminate’
IIA–and also combinatorial neutrality and anonymity–and to ‘make them easier to work
12See, for instance, Mathieu Martin and Maurice Salles (2013).
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with’, the next step should have been to offer another proof of Arrow’s theorem. My
conjecture is that, while at RAND, Quine tried to prove Arrow’s theorem, but did not
succeed, and considering, back at Harvard, that he had more important, or at least more
interesting from his point of view, things to do, he abandoned this research. So the ques-
tion remains: Is it possible to derive a Quinean proof of Arrow’s theorem? Furthermore,
are there Quinean proofs of the impossibilities of various preference aggregation functions?
Related to these questions, we may wonder whether we can derive a Quinean version of
preferencism.
In the more abstract setting where sets are considered rather than relations, another
issue arises: Is it possible to have a set-theoretic construction which would convert the
Arrovian framework in this abstract setting? In case of a positive answer, would it be pos-
sible to prove an inconsistency? Finally, would it be possible to obtain something which
is interpretable from an intuitive point of view?13
There is a small literature on the use of Boolean functions in social choice, for instance
Gil Kalai (2002) and Ryan O’Donnell (2014). My comments here apply to O’Donnell.
O’Donnell considers three alternatives and a Boolean function (of the variety described
in footnote 6) for every two-alternative subsets (the Boolean function is not necessarily
identical for each two-alternative subset). For each two-alternative subset, the Boolean
function selects one alternative. The problem then is to obtain a Condorcet winner (an
alternative selected against the two others). This is quite remote from Quine’s analysis,
but I think that some further explorations could be undertaken. However, the restriction to
two values, {0, 1}, or {−1, 1} in O’Donnell, amounts to restrict the analysis to asymmetric
binary relations (no indifference). Also, we cannot contemplate an analysis concerning
transitivity or transitivity-type properties of the preferences. Incidentally, I believe that
Quine came up against this difficulty: how can transitivity be rendered uniquely in terms
of intersection, union and complementation of sets?
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